Economia
Numa altura em que crescem as dúvidas (ver aqui e aqui) crescem as dúvidas quanto à capacidade do Governo grego para fazer aprovar as novas medidas de austeridade exigidas pela União Europeia e o FMI chamo a atenção para as declarações do Governador do Banco de França (e membro do Conselho do BCE) sobre as consequências de uma eventual reestruturação da dívida pública grega proferidas numa conferência de imprensa realizada ontem. De acordo com o relato divulgado pela Bloomberg, Christina Noyer terá considerado que:
«“If we restructure Greek debt, that means Greece defaults.”
“And what are the consequences of a default? The banks with the most Greek bonds are Greek banks. The Greek banks themselves will be badly damaged. When the banking system is stricken, what do you have to do to prevent the financing of the economy from collapsing? You have to recapitalize the banks. Who will recapitalize the Greek banking system? The Greek state.”
“That means the Greek state will gain nothing. It will invest in the banking sector everything that it has gained in the restructuring.”
“Next there are the Greek insurers and pension funds” who will be hurt. “That means it will weigh on the Greek population’s savings, which could cause a drop in consumer spending and Greek growth will take a hit. This counters the Greek recovery.”
“Then, what else is there in terms of Greek creditors? There’s the European public sector, European governments and the central banks. This is directly tapping the European taxpayer.”
“If we make European states pay, the mechanism of European financing will stop immediately. The states will not continue putting their taxpayers’ money on the line when their loans have just been cleaned out, when they’re taking losses on the money they’re lending. So that’s the end of support from other European states.”
“And for the central banks, what happens? Greek debt will become debt that is no longer worth anything. It’s no longer debt that can be considered as sufficiently safe for operations in the Euro System. That means by definition that to restructure is to become ineligible as collateral. If it’s ineligible, then it means a large part of what the Greek banks bring as collateral for refinancing can no longer be used. That means the Greek banking system can no longer be financed.”
“The next day what happens? Greece needs to find investors because the Greek state won’t move from deficit to surplus overnight. As long as it doesn’t have a primary surplus, the Greek state needs to borrow. International investors, that small group that remains, have just been restructured. It’s not the next day they’ll come back with financing.”
"The Euro System won’t refinance. The European states won’t finance. The IMF won’t go there alone. No one will finance the Greek state in coming years. That means the meltdown of the Greek economy. This is a horror story. That’s why we’re against a restructuring.” »
De salientar ainda dois pontos. O primeiro é a existência de alguma (pequena) abertura para a extensão da maturidade dos empréstimos relativament à qual refere que: “The lengthening of maturities brings very difficult legal questions. There’s a strong chance it will be the equivalent of a default.” E em segundo lugar a afirmação de que “When we’re in a monetary union and you need to restore your competitiveness, it is necessary to have the equivalent of an internal devaluation. Cut production costs. There is no other solution.”
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Economia
Ainda sobre a Grécia - As declarações do Governador do Banco de França
Numa altura em que crescem as dúvidas (ver aqui e aqui) crescem as dúvidas quanto à capacidade do Governo grego para fazer aprovar as novas medidas de austeridade exigidas pela União Europeia e o FMI chamo a atenção para as declarações do Governador do Banco de França (e membro do Conselho do BCE) sobre as consequências de uma eventual reestruturação da dívida pública grega proferidas numa conferência de imprensa realizada ontem. De acordo com o relato divulgado pela Bloomberg, Christina Noyer terá considerado que:
«“If we restructure Greek debt, that means Greece defaults.”
“And what are the consequences of a default? The banks with the most Greek bonds are Greek banks. The Greek banks themselves will be badly damaged. When the banking system is stricken, what do you have to do to prevent the financing of the economy from collapsing? You have to recapitalize the banks. Who will recapitalize the Greek banking system? The Greek state.”
“That means the Greek state will gain nothing. It will invest in the banking sector everything that it has gained in the restructuring.”
“Next there are the Greek insurers and pension funds” who will be hurt. “That means it will weigh on the Greek population’s savings, which could cause a drop in consumer spending and Greek growth will take a hit. This counters the Greek recovery.”
“Then, what else is there in terms of Greek creditors? There’s the European public sector, European governments and the central banks. This is directly tapping the European taxpayer.”
“If we make European states pay, the mechanism of European financing will stop immediately. The states will not continue putting their taxpayers’ money on the line when their loans have just been cleaned out, when they’re taking losses on the money they’re lending. So that’s the end of support from other European states.”
“And for the central banks, what happens? Greek debt will become debt that is no longer worth anything. It’s no longer debt that can be considered as sufficiently safe for operations in the Euro System. That means by definition that to restructure is to become ineligible as collateral. If it’s ineligible, then it means a large part of what the Greek banks bring as collateral for refinancing can no longer be used. That means the Greek banking system can no longer be financed.”
“The next day what happens? Greece needs to find investors because the Greek state won’t move from deficit to surplus overnight. As long as it doesn’t have a primary surplus, the Greek state needs to borrow. International investors, that small group that remains, have just been restructured. It’s not the next day they’ll come back with financing.”
"The Euro System won’t refinance. The European states won’t finance. The IMF won’t go there alone. No one will finance the Greek state in coming years. That means the meltdown of the Greek economy. This is a horror story. That’s why we’re against a restructuring.” »
De salientar ainda dois pontos. O primeiro é a existência de alguma (pequena) abertura para a extensão da maturidade dos empréstimos relativament à qual refere que: “The lengthening of maturities brings very difficult legal questions. There’s a strong chance it will be the equivalent of a default.” E em segundo lugar a afirmação de que “When we’re in a monetary union and you need to restore your competitiveness, it is necessary to have the equivalent of an internal devaluation. Cut production costs. There is no other solution.”
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- Ler Os Outros: Eurozone At Breakpoint
Um post muito interessante no Alphaville: "Cailloux & Co expect the crisis to continue and threaten the entire euro area because policy makers still don’t understand market dynamics. A Greek debt swap might bring temporary relief but investors will...
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Pronunciando-se sobre a proposta francesa para um "roll-over" da dívida grega detida pelos investidores privados a Standard & Poors veio considerar que em ambas as opções colocadas aos investidores no âmbito daquela proposta "investors...
- O Texto Da Proposta Francesa
Está acessível aqui (via Alphaville). De acordo com os pressupostos do documento documento o montante dos títulos que vencem até meados de 2014 ascende a 85,5 mil milhões de euros dos quais 25 mil nilhões de euros são detidos pelo BCE e os restantes...
- Ler Os Outros: Sobre A Grécia
Dois excelentes artigos sobre a situação na Grécia. No primeiro artigo, publicado no WSJ, os Professores John Cochrane e Anil Kashyap referem a propósito da proposta alemã de que os bancos que "the only way to get banks to "voluntarily"...
- É A Dívida Pública, Estúpido! Parte Ii
Um continente de más idéias: John Cochrane discute os problemas de endividamento público na Europa e repercussões sobre o Euro: "Conventional wisdom says that sovereign defaults mean the end of the euro: If Greece defaults it has to leave the single...