Economia
The Economist sobre a nova tendencia de impor tarifas sobre o comércio: "... Governments using tariffs as trade weapons now have to calculate the consequences far more carefully. This is borne out, for example, by Mexico’s response this month to the suspension by America of a NAFTA programme that allowed some Mexican truckers to carry goods north of the border. Mexico raised some tariffs, but by less than NAFTA rules allowed, and chose the goods carefully in order to limit the damage to its own industries. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence that developing countries, at least, continue to use tariffs extensively. In the World Bank’s study, tariff increases accounted for half of the protective measures by these countries. Ecuador raised duties on 600 goods. Russia increased them on used cars. India put them up on some kinds of steel. Developing countries have more scope for raising tariffs without breaking WTO rules than richer ones do, because the gap between their applied rates and the ceilings they agreed to is greater than for developed countries. When governments do impose tariffs, vertical supply chains amplify their effects. Because tariffs are typically levied on the gross value crossing the border (with some exceptions, such as exports from Mexican maquiladoras), trade responds more to changes in tariffs—down or up—with global supply chains than without. But there is another, more subtle reason to worry about even small rises in tariffs. Theoretical models that incorporate vertical specialisation find that it takes off only when tariffs fall below a threshold level. Once this happens, however, trade explodes, so that a slight lowering of trade barriers can cause a huge increase in trade. By the same token, if tariffs rose above a certain point—which might be below the maximum agreed on at the WTO—global supply chains would disintegrate. Trade would drop even more steeply than it has in recent months. That said, supply chains need not snap so easily. Even if tariffs go up, other costs that determine the viability of supply chains may go down: the price of oil (and hence the cost of transport) has fallen a long way in the past year. Firms have invested a lot in their supply chains and will be loth to abandon them. And if global supply chains do survive, vertical specialisation could help trade recover speedily when demand returns. Although increased tariffs are a cause for concern, they are far from the only form of protection being used in this crisis. Two-thirds of the trade-restricting measures documented by the World Bank are non-tariff barriers of various kinds. As with tariffs, developing countries are the principal wielders of these weapons. Indonesia has specified that certain categories of goods, such as clothes, shoes and toys, may be imported through only five ports. Argentina has imposed discretionary licensing requirements on car parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes and leather goods; licences for all these used to be granted automatically. Some countries have imposed outright import bans, often justified by a tightening of safety rules or by environmental concerns. For example, China has stopped imports of a wide range of European food and drink, including Irish pork, Italian brandy and Spanish dairy products. The Indian government has banned Chinese toys. In addition, anti-dumping is on the increase. The number of anti-dumping cases initiated at the WTO had been declining, but it started to pick up in the second half of 2007. The data for 2008 are not yet complete but Chad Brown, an economist at Brandeis University, estimates that the number was 31% higher than in the previous year. The number of cases ending with extra duties went up by 20%. India was the biggest initiator of anti-dumping action, and America and the European Union imposed duties most frequently. Rich countries’ weapon of choice so far is neither tariffs nor non-tariff barriers to imports. They have been keen users instead of subsidies to troubled domestic industries, particularly carmakers. Some economists, such as Gene Grossman, of Princeton University, cite this as evidence that global sourcing has changed the political economy of protection. The American automotive industry no longer lobbies for direct protection, as it used to, because it imports much of its value-added and competes with foreign firms that assemble their cars in America. Carmakers now prefer explicit subsidies, and the world is replete with examples. Besides America, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden have all also provided direct or indirect subsidies to carmakers. The World Bank reckons that proposed subsidies for the car industry amount to $48 billion. Nearly 90% of this is in rich countries, where it can easily be slipped into budgetary packages to stimulate demand. The worry about such subsidies is that they could cause production to switch from more efficient plants (eg, in central and eastern Europe) to less efficient ones in rich countries with deep pockets (eg, in western Europe). Whether the location of output is shifting is not yet clear, but politicians plainly hope it will. On March 19th Luc Chatel, the French industry minister, boasted that Renault’s plans to create 400 jobs at a factory near Paris by “repatriating” some production from Slovenia was the result of government aid. Renault has denied this, saying that it was at full capacity in Slovenia..." Leia mais: http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13362027
- Integração Econômica Na América Latina
Latin American geoeconomics A continental divide The region is falling in behind two alternative blocks: the market-led Pacific Alliance and the more statist Mercosur ON MAY 23rd in the Colombian city of Cali the presidents of four Latin American...
- Ide
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) revised down its 2012 forecast for global inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to less than $1.6 trillion. Inflows in the first half of 2012 fell by 8%...
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Brasileira com um paper no NBER! Não sou eu mas, de qualquer forma, VIVA!!! Heterogeneous Productivity Response to Tariff Reduction: Evidence from Brazilian Manufacturing Firms Adriana Schor NBER Working Paper No. w10544 Issued in June 2004...
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Sim, é fato: muito governo pode impedir o "espetáculo do crescimento" Texto em pdf. Trade, Regulations, and Growth - Bineswaree Bolaky Caroline Freund* University of Maryland The World Bank - March 2004 Abstract: Trade does not stimulate growth...
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Republicanos = Democratas? Republicanos nunca foram libertários. Menos ainda em 2003... Trechos: "The Republican Party has changed too, for the worse; it is becoming the party of big government. With the GOP in full control of the White House and...
Economia
Economia Internacional - tarifas
The Economist sobre a nova tendencia de impor tarifas sobre o comércio: "... Governments using tariffs as trade weapons now have to calculate the consequences far more carefully. This is borne out, for example, by Mexico’s response this month to the suspension by America of a NAFTA programme that allowed some Mexican truckers to carry goods north of the border. Mexico raised some tariffs, but by less than NAFTA rules allowed, and chose the goods carefully in order to limit the damage to its own industries. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence that developing countries, at least, continue to use tariffs extensively. In the World Bank’s study, tariff increases accounted for half of the protective measures by these countries. Ecuador raised duties on 600 goods. Russia increased them on used cars. India put them up on some kinds of steel. Developing countries have more scope for raising tariffs without breaking WTO rules than richer ones do, because the gap between their applied rates and the ceilings they agreed to is greater than for developed countries. When governments do impose tariffs, vertical supply chains amplify their effects. Because tariffs are typically levied on the gross value crossing the border (with some exceptions, such as exports from Mexican maquiladoras), trade responds more to changes in tariffs—down or up—with global supply chains than without. But there is another, more subtle reason to worry about even small rises in tariffs. Theoretical models that incorporate vertical specialisation find that it takes off only when tariffs fall below a threshold level. Once this happens, however, trade explodes, so that a slight lowering of trade barriers can cause a huge increase in trade. By the same token, if tariffs rose above a certain point—which might be below the maximum agreed on at the WTO—global supply chains would disintegrate. Trade would drop even more steeply than it has in recent months. That said, supply chains need not snap so easily. Even if tariffs go up, other costs that determine the viability of supply chains may go down: the price of oil (and hence the cost of transport) has fallen a long way in the past year. Firms have invested a lot in their supply chains and will be loth to abandon them. And if global supply chains do survive, vertical specialisation could help trade recover speedily when demand returns. Although increased tariffs are a cause for concern, they are far from the only form of protection being used in this crisis. Two-thirds of the trade-restricting measures documented by the World Bank are non-tariff barriers of various kinds. As with tariffs, developing countries are the principal wielders of these weapons. Indonesia has specified that certain categories of goods, such as clothes, shoes and toys, may be imported through only five ports. Argentina has imposed discretionary licensing requirements on car parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes and leather goods; licences for all these used to be granted automatically. Some countries have imposed outright import bans, often justified by a tightening of safety rules or by environmental concerns. For example, China has stopped imports of a wide range of European food and drink, including Irish pork, Italian brandy and Spanish dairy products. The Indian government has banned Chinese toys. In addition, anti-dumping is on the increase. The number of anti-dumping cases initiated at the WTO had been declining, but it started to pick up in the second half of 2007. The data for 2008 are not yet complete but Chad Brown, an economist at Brandeis University, estimates that the number was 31% higher than in the previous year. The number of cases ending with extra duties went up by 20%. India was the biggest initiator of anti-dumping action, and America and the European Union imposed duties most frequently. Rich countries’ weapon of choice so far is neither tariffs nor non-tariff barriers to imports. They have been keen users instead of subsidies to troubled domestic industries, particularly carmakers. Some economists, such as Gene Grossman, of Princeton University, cite this as evidence that global sourcing has changed the political economy of protection. The American automotive industry no longer lobbies for direct protection, as it used to, because it imports much of its value-added and competes with foreign firms that assemble their cars in America. Carmakers now prefer explicit subsidies, and the world is replete with examples. Besides America, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden have all also provided direct or indirect subsidies to carmakers. The World Bank reckons that proposed subsidies for the car industry amount to $48 billion. Nearly 90% of this is in rich countries, where it can easily be slipped into budgetary packages to stimulate demand. The worry about such subsidies is that they could cause production to switch from more efficient plants (eg, in central and eastern Europe) to less efficient ones in rich countries with deep pockets (eg, in western Europe). Whether the location of output is shifting is not yet clear, but politicians plainly hope it will. On March 19th Luc Chatel, the French industry minister, boasted that Renault’s plans to create 400 jobs at a factory near Paris by “repatriating” some production from Slovenia was the result of government aid. Renault has denied this, saying that it was at full capacity in Slovenia..." Leia mais: http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13362027
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- Integração Econômica Na América Latina
Latin American geoeconomics A continental divide The region is falling in behind two alternative blocks: the market-led Pacific Alliance and the more statist Mercosur ON MAY 23rd in the Colombian city of Cali the presidents of four Latin American...
- Ide
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) revised down its 2012 forecast for global inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to less than $1.6 trillion. Inflows in the first half of 2012 fell by 8%...
-
Brasileira com um paper no NBER! Não sou eu mas, de qualquer forma, VIVA!!! Heterogeneous Productivity Response to Tariff Reduction: Evidence from Brazilian Manufacturing Firms Adriana Schor NBER Working Paper No. w10544 Issued in June 2004...
-
Sim, é fato: muito governo pode impedir o "espetáculo do crescimento" Texto em pdf. Trade, Regulations, and Growth - Bineswaree Bolaky Caroline Freund* University of Maryland The World Bank - March 2004 Abstract: Trade does not stimulate growth...
-
Republicanos = Democratas? Republicanos nunca foram libertários. Menos ainda em 2003... Trechos: "The Republican Party has changed too, for the worse; it is becoming the party of big government. With the GOP in full control of the White House and...